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The EU, Russia and Ukraine:  
a double track with no end?  
 
Anne Marie Le Gloannec
To fully grasp the breadth and depth of the conflict over 
Ukraine, we must look at the history of EU–Russia relations. 
The conflict over Ukraine encapsulates not what went wrong 
with these relations, but rather what was wrong all along, 
ever since the break-up of the Soviet Union. Two asymmetri-
cal and incompatible worlds are sharing a continent, and it is 
this incompatibility that has flared up in Ukraine. 
The title of this brief might suggest that there is an ‘EU policy’ 
and that we can treat the EU and Russia as two entities, albeit 
different in nature. That is not the case. EU treaties under-
line that foreign policies fall within the remit of the various 
member states, though national foreign policies are to be 
coordinated and solidarity respected, while instruments and 
institutions have been created to promote coordination and 
solidarity. EU member-state foreign policies, with regard 
to Russia for instance, have sometimes competed with one 
another and sometimes been coordinated, while the European 
Commission and the European Council have promoted secto-
rial projects and initiatives without much strategic purpose. 
After the demise of the Soviet Union, the EU and its member 
states  have not managed to define a convincing and coherent 
policy vis-à-vis Russia. Since the outbreak of the conflict, the 
EU and its member states have managed to define the fine line 
between appeasement and war, mainly thanks to Chancellor 
Merkel’s talent for compromise and inclusion. However, this 
will not bring an end to the war in Ukraine; it will not restore 
the country’s sovereignty, nor contribute to a fruitful working 
relationship with an authoritarian Russian regime. 
 
The twenty-year transition: 1990–2000s: the EU and 
member-state policies on Russia
Two decades of trial and error
Since the demise of the Soviet Union, the EU and its member 
states have struggled to define a policy vis-à-vis Russia, based 
on certain assumptions, and have employed specific instru-
ments accordingly. Throughout these years, which fall into 
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Summary
In March 2014, Russia took over the Crimean Peninsula by stealth. 
Having annexed it on 18 March, Russia made further forays in 
the eastern part of Ukraine, principally in Donetsk and Luhansk, 
where it provided secessionists with manpower and know-how, 
weapons (including heavy weapons), information technology and 
propaganda, as well as political support. Discarding the idea that 
territory or history alone can explain Russia’s grab, we assume 
that, besides increases in gas prices and demands for changes in 
the constitution while stoking unrest and violating borders, the 
Kremlin has resorted to war in eastern Ukraine as a means to ex-
ert pressure on the Kyiv government. What matters for Moscow 
is probably to prevent democracy from taking root in Ukraine, or 
in Western Ukraine for that matter. To the Kremlin, a failed state 
would be preferable to a democratic state, divided or not. 
If this interpretation is correct, to what extent can the conflict 
be resolved? Must the interests claimed by the Kremlin be taken 
into account in order to bring peace in Ukraine and reset EU–
Russia relations? What can the EU – and the West otherwise, i.e. 
the United States – do? 
This Policy Brief argues that a solution to the conflict is beyond 
reach, because the conflict concerns two opposing worlds. If the 
war is eventually a means for Vladimir Putin to stifle democracy 
in Ukraine and to strengthen his hold over Russia, there is no 
room for compromise. The history of EU–Russia relations and 
the structure that has characterized them since the demise of 
the USSR underline the how difficult it is for the EU to maintain, 
or indeed establish, a balanced relationship with an increasing-
ly authoritarian and predatory regime based on one-man rule. 
The EU may have inadvertently played into the hand of the Krem-
lin – through lack of imagination and strategy, rather than con-
tempt for a wounded power, as Putin has contended. Since the 
outbreak of the crisis in 2014, however, the EU has mustered the 
capacity to target sanctions at Russian individuals that bear re-
sponsibility for the war in Ukraine, and at specific sectors crucial 
to the Russian economy, all the while attempting to pursue po-
litical dialogue with the authorities – a ‘double-track approach’. 
But we must ask: What is the purpose of sanctions that do not 
bring about changes in the opponent’s political behaviour? or 
of a dialogue that does not lead to a solution? And is there any-
thing that the EU and its member states can do?
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two periods – the 1990s up to roughly 2004, when Vladimir 
Putin began tightening the screws, and then ensuing decade 
until the beginning of the war in Ukraine in 2014 – the EU 
and some of its member states have resorted to different 
approaches, even though all member states, gathered in the 
Council, have agreed to the Commission’s designs. 
From the early 1990s until around 2004, when it became 
increasingly obvious that once Putin had consolidated his 
power as head of state, the Moscow regime was deviating from 
democracy and the rule of law, the EU and individual member 
states assumed that Russia was a kind of bigger Poland, with 
immense promises and disturbing difficulties, that would 
become a full-fledged democracy in the foreseeable future. 
Accordingly, the instruments devised by the Commission 
were copy-pasted from EU Enlargement: TACIS, which offered 
programmes tailored for the regions, and the PCA. Even the 
ENP was offered – a major blunder, since the EU should never 
have treated the former empire as a mere ‘neighbour’. Yet ENP 
inspired the Four Spaces, agreed upon in Saint Petersburg in 
2004, although the  notion of ‘shared values’ was discarded; 
likewise, what the EU likes to call ‘convergence’, but which 
actually refers to third-party adoption of EU rules and laws. 
A Common Strategy was adopted by the European Council in 
1999, but proved to be a mere catalogue. In parallel, Berlin 
and Paris attempted to strike an alliance with Russia. Yet the 
Berlin–Paris–Moscow arrangement that seemed to bloom in 
2004/2005 was more symbolic than substantial.
 
When it became evident that Russia would not ‘converge’, a 
new rationale emerged to engage the country in a new way: 
partnership through modernization. Germany was the defin-
ing actor, for many reasons – economic, political, historical 
and ideational. The slogan the German government put forth, 
Annäherung durch Verflechtung, smacked of Ostpolitik’s 
Wandel durch Annäherung. ‘Regime change’ vanished from 
‘rapprochement through cooperation’. Yet it was assumed 
that increasing and reciprocal commercial ties between Rus-
sia and the West, the EU, and Germany in particular, would 
promote political cooperation. In any case, as one French 
civil servant put it: ‘Only the Germans connect the dots.’ This 
policy inspired the European Commission, which made it its 
own in 2009.
Asymmetries
During these years, it was nonetheless obvious that relations 
between the EU and Russia were highly asymmetrical. Today 
several Russian officials contend that Russia was humiliated, 
and that the EU and the West were seeking to impose their 
values. On the other hand, if there was an EU policy, it lacked 
coherence – due to differences in approaches between the 
Commission and the member states, and divergences between 
the latter, with their differing histories and geographies, the 
desire of some countries to wrench themselves away from 
Russia’s mighty shadow, or conversely the expectations nur-
tured by certain governments and companies when cultivat-
ing their Russian counterparts. While Russian authorities 
ranted against what they saw as the disrespect of the West 
and the EU for the former empire, Gazprom nonetheless 
devised a systematic policy of gradually buying its way into 
the EU energy market(s), serving the Kremlin and its friends 
through a game of ‘musical shares’, as well described by two 
former energy ministers.1  
A series of asymmetries were compounding one another, 
without compensating each other. There is no room here to 
delve into the myth of broken promises, as to whether or not 
the West, the USA and the German Chancellor promised not 
to expand NATO. Nor is it necessary to recall all the doors 
that the West opened, from the G-7 to the Council of Europe, 
NATO, and the EU or the WTO. Certainly, all these institu-
tions bore a Western imprint, but the counter-projects that 
Medvedev or Putin put on the table before and after the war 
against Georgia would have driven a wedge between the USA 
and the EU, consolidating Gazprom’s monopoly on the EU 
market. And finally, both the nature of the Russian regime 
and the nature of the Kremlin’s relations with its surround-
ings accentuated the lop-sidedness of EU–Russia relations. In 
the early 1990s, Russia might have appeared to be on the way 
towards democracy and the rule of law – but it was not. Suf-
fice here to say that, according to various analysts, Vladimir 
Putin, more than Boris Yeltsin, relied (and relies) on the myth 
of the ‘besieged fortress’ to build and maintain his power: a 
fortress besieged from abroad. Conversely, while insisting on 
Russia’s sovereignty, the Kremlin has shown disregard for the 
sovereignty of former Soviet republics and satellites. From 
the early 1990s till the present, there has been remarkable 
continuity here, as epitomized by the numerous embargoes 
imposed on these countries. 
Ukraine: a strategy and no end?
Well before 2014, when Ukrainian sovereignty was grossly 
violated and a hybrid war launched in eastern Ukraine, rela-
tions between the EU and Russia – and, albeit differently, 
between the USA and Russia – had been structurally difficult 
and asymmetrical. The USA, the Atlantic Alliance and the 
EU recognized the right of former Soviet republics and satel-
lites to choose their orientation, although not all agreed on 
including Ukraine in NATO. In particular, the German and the 
French governments  opposed the latter, at the NATO summit 
held in Bucharest in May 2008, in order to placate the Russian 
authorities. However, that did not prevent Russia from waging 
a war against Georgia a few months later, using disproportion-
ate violence against a small country whose president had been 
unwise enough to respond to provocations. Though successive 
Russian governments had failed to fulfil their commitments 
towards Tbilisi for years, the Kremlin violated Georgia’s borders 
and gradually incorporated the two provinces of Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia into its own territory, trampling the European 
1 Boris Nemtsov and Vladimir Milov, 2008: Putin: the Bottom Line, posted on 
21 March. Boris Nemtsov and Vladimir Milov, 2008: Putin and Gazprom. 
An independent export report, Moscow, http://www.europeanenergyre-
view.com/data/docs/Viewpoints/Putin%20and%20Gazprom_Nemts-
ov%20en%20Milov.pdf. Boris Nemtsov was assassinated in 2015.
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order, the Helsinki Agreement and the Charter of Paris. The 
war in Georgia was a rehearsal for the war to come in Ukraine.
It is difficult to understand how EU institutions and mem-
ber states could be so sanguine, in autumn 2013, when they 
expected the Ukrainian Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych to 
sign the Association Agreement (AA) and the related Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA), at the summit 
to be held in Vilnius in December. To be fair, we should firstly 
recall that successive Ukrainian governments, including that of 
Yanukovych, who supposedly had close ties and connections 
with the Kremlin, were keen on reaching agreements with the 
EU and wary of joining the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), 
and later the Eurasian Union. Secondly, negotiations between 
the EU and Ukraine had been going on for years without stirring 
protest in Moscow. An upgrade in EU–UA relations had been 
envisaged before and after the Orange Revolution. Negotia-
tions had begun after Ukraine joined the WTO in 2008 and an 
agreement was initialled in March 2012 – again without much 
protest.2  However, in the summer of 2013, the Kremlin started 
to exert enormous pressure on Ukraine. It imposed an embargo 
on multiple Russian goods and later said it would cancel the 
free trade agreement with Ukraine. Several bilateral meetings 
between Putin and Yanukovych were held in November, prior to 
the Vilnius summit. After ignoring the significance of a DCFTA, 
after, in a second phase, putting on the table a counter-plan to 
the EU and the AA, the Kremlin started playing hardball. 
It is the policy, stupid:
The association agreement and the DCFTA with Ukraine had 
two sides, a technical one and a political one, closely inter-
twined. Technically, agreeing to both the DCFTA and the Eur-
asian Customs Union of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia that 
came into existence in 2010 as part of the EEU, would have 
been difficult because of differences in external tariffs, which 
are higher at the EEU borders than the case with EU and WTO 
tariffs. According to several experts, however, a DCFTA and 
the Eurasian Customs Union would not have been theoreti-
cally incompatible, if rules of origins had been respected.3 
However, Russia showed little interest in resolving the techni-
cal problems within the WTO framework, especially as some 
EEU members are not party to it.4 It was only from a position 
of strength that Russia entered trilateral ministerial discus-
sions on implementation of the AA and DCFTA, in September 
2014 – this was after it had launched its bid over Ukraine, 
and had threatened to discard the free trade agreement with 
Kyiv and after the EU had agreed to delay implementation of 
the DCFTA until December 2015.5 Politically, commitments 
to both the EU and the EEU were incompatible. The methods 
and the rationale underlying them were at loggerheads. For 
the President of the Commission and the President of the 
Council, coercion was excluded: ‘the European Union will 
not force Ukraine, or any other partner, to choose between 
the European Union or any other regional entity.’6 By con-
trast, the Kremlin resorted to trade embargoes, bilateral pres-
sures, rewards and coercion, before and after Maidan, and 
Yanukovych’s flight. 
With the benefit of hindsight, Western and European ana-
lysts have tried to understand the significance of Ukraine 
for Russia and the Russian regime. Much has been read into 
it: history and the ‘ties that bind’, economic intercourse and 
strategic value, some of which are overrated. When, in 2013, 
Vladimir Putin recalled with passion the blood ties link-
ing Russians and Ukrainians, a sombre-looking Ukrainian 
president – albeit an official ally of the Kremlin – stood by. 
Opinion polls conducted by the Razumkov Centre in 2014, 
before the annexation of Crimea, showed that a majority of 
Ukrainians cherished their independence. The importance of 
Ukraine as a gas transit route (one which Gazprom and the 
Kremlin had earlier sought to bypass), the gas fields off the 
Crimean Peninsula, the port of Sevastopol – all these reasons 
have been put forward to explain the Kremlin’s policy. 
However, a democratic regime would have heeded interna-
tional law and international commitments and searched for 
peaceful arrangements. Hence, we can assume that the per-
spective of an EU and potentially democratic Ukraine irked 
the Kremlin most. If so, territory as such matters less than 
how it can be employed to pressure, coerce and bleed Kyiv. 
 
What kinds of EU responses?
As the Kremlin tightened its grip on Kyiv, in the summer of 
2013 the Commission grasped the upcoming difficulties, 
although devising a strategy did not fall within its ambit.7 
The member states should have been thinking strategically, 
but abstained from this instead of anticipating the Krem-
lin’s reactions. However, in 2014, they devised a coherent, 
double-track approach, bearing a strong German imprint 
and owing to Angela Merkel’s political shrewdness. On the 
one hand, the member states, in small formats or collectively, 
have pursued discussions – albeit difficult and often fruitless 
–  with the Kremlin, including two Minsk agreements, Minsk 
I in September 2014, and Minsk II in February 2015; trilat-
eral talks regarding the DCFTA – AA, which started in July 
2014 and resumed in April 2015 (coinciding in both cases 
with the two Minsk agreements); and, in January 2015, in 
Davos, Chancellor Merkel offered to conclude a free trade 
agreement with Russia, picking up on a rather vague pro-
posal that President Putin had made in 2010 when criticiz-
2 House of Lords, European Union Committee 2008: The European Union 
and Russia, London, The Stationery Office Ltd, May.
3 Bill Krist and Samuel Benka, 2014,  ‘Trade Agreements and the Russia–
Ukraine Conflict’, Washington DC: America’s Trade Policy, 21 March. 
America’s Trade Policy is the blog of the Washington International Trade 
Association. See also European Commission 2014: Myths about the EU–
Ukraine Association Agreement. Setting the facts straight, 22 January.  
4 Both the President of the Commission, José Manuel Barroso, and Russia 
warned that entering the Eurasian Customs Union (part of EEE) ECU would 
be incompatible with a potential DCFTA.
5 Andrew Rettman, 2014. ‘Russia seeks new veto on EU–Ukraine pact’, 
Brussels, euobserver, 10 July. 
6 European Commission 2013: ‘ Joint statement by the President of the Euro-
pean Commission José Manuel Barroso and the President of the European 
Council Herman Van Rompuy on Ukraine’, Brussels, 25 November.
7 Štefan Füle, European Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighbourhood 
Policy, 2013: Statement on the pressure exercised by Russia on countries 
of the Eastern Partnership, European Commission, European Parliament 
Plenary, in Strasbourg, 11 September.
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ing the emergence of a European energy market. On the other 
hand, the EU and its member states have taken three series 
of targeted sanctions, reinforcing some of them over time.8  
Sanctions against Russia are almost unheard-of. In 1994, 
when the first war against Chechnya was launched, the EU 
merely delayed the implementation of the PCA. In 1999, 
when the second Chechnya war began, a few, limited sanc-
tions were agreed, only to be rescinded a few months later, 
after Putin’s election as president. After the Russia–Georgia 
war, Bernard Kouchner, the French foreign minister whose 
government was then in charge of the rotating EU Presidency, 
dismissed any sanctions against Russia. It has been said that 
the EU goes in for economic sanctions more than military 
intervention. However, up to 2014 – aside from sanctions 
against China after the Tiananmen massacre – the EU had 
targeted its economic sanctions against small states. 
What is the purpose of sanctions? EU institutions and the 
member states do not do regime change – but they want a 
change in Russian policy towards Ukraine. This has not been 
achieved, despite temporary lulls after Minsk I and, espe-
cially, Minsk II – which grants eastern Ukrainian secession-
ists important rights, does not contribute to controlling the 
Ukrainian-Russian border except on paper, and leaves Kyiv 
to subsidize Donetsk and Luhansk. Sanctions do not even 
dent the legitimacy of the regime. On the contrary, a major-
ity of Russians increasingly believe that the EU is targeting 
the population – moreover, a huge majority stand behind 
the Russian president.9 Sanctions may be politically counter-
productive, at least in the short term; although, compounded 
with lower energy prices and a skewed economic structure 
they impact the country’s finances. 
Eventually, however, sanctions are necessary, for three rea-
sons. Firstly, business as usual will not do. The year 2014 
marked a major change in Europe’s continental order. Sec-
ondly, sanctions are the main instrument that the EU member 
states can agree on, as part of a package deal that includes 
discussions and negotiations. The double track concerns the 
member states as much as it does Moscow. It is an attempt, 
especially on the part of powerful Germany, to assuage and 
embrace all, sometimes through (peer) pressure, sometimes 
through persuasion. Thirdly, sanctions may have an impact 
on Russia’s policies and polity in the long run. This is a 
gamble, and the effects themselves are unknown. Sanctions 
may foster change for the worse, accentuating the process of 
‘Weimarization’, to use the vocabulary former Prime Minister 
Mikhail M. Kasyanov.
There is a competition between the short term and the long 
term, and between those EU member states that seek to main-
tain sanctions and those that want to opt out, hurt as they are 
by EU sanctions against Russia – and by Russian counter-
sanctions. Since the conflict over Ukraine and in Ukraine 
seems set to continue as long as the Kremlin deems it neces-
sary to stoke it, what can the EU and its member states do? 
Firstly, they will have to put their house in order: they must 
maintain a relatively coherent position regarding Russia, 
through incentives, cajoling and pressures for those member 
states tempted to get their own way with the Kremlin, while 
defending and upholding EU values. Here the Commission 
plays a primary role in overseeing the implementation of 
rules, regarding legal tenders, the interdiction to swap shares 
etc. in the EU energy market. This undercuts the spread of 
corruption in the EU, from inside and outside its borders. 
Secondly, one obvious piece that is missing is strategy and 
political contingency planning, in particular in the run-up to 
the Vilnius summit. The EU has never had proper strategies. 
Strategies and contingency planning will have to be devised 
if the EU is to be able to foresee Russian moves. 
8 Sabine Fischer, 2015: ‘European Union Sanctions Against Russia. Objec-
tives, Impacts and Next Steps’, Berlin SWP Comments 17, March.
9 Ibid. p. 5.
